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CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF
JUDGE AND JURY
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, a wave of sentencing reform has spread
across the country and revolutionized state sentencing laws. State legis-
latures and sentencing commissions from Alaska to Arkansas have re-
placed discretionary sentencing laws with an assortment of structuralized
guidelines and systems that seek to increase uniformity and fairness in
sentence decision making.' One preeminent commentator noted that
"[t]he field of sentencing, once rightly accused of being lawless, is now
replete with law.",2 Yet recent United States Supreme Court cases have
placed the sustainability of modem sentencing laws in jeopardy. In its
latest blow to determinate sentencing, the United States Supreme Court
held in Cunningham v. California3 that California's determinate sentenc-
ing law violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge rather than a
jury to find facts exposing a defendant to a lengthier sentence. 4 By in-
validating California's sentencing scheme, Cunningham raises the fore-
most question in sentencing philosophy: is justice better served through
judges or juries?
An investigation into recent United States Supreme Court cases re-
veals conflicting answers to this question. In the seminal case Apprendi
v. New Jersey,5 the Supreme Court established the principle that any fac-
tor, other than a prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the
statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.6
In 2005, the Court applied the Apprendi principle in United States v.
Booker7 to override the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 However, the
two majority opinions delivered in Booker left the future of determinate
sentencing in a conceptual and pragmatic morass. While the first opinion
concentrated on the constitutional problems with the Guidelines' reliance
on judicial fact-finding, 9 the remedial opinion rendered the Guidelines
wholly advisory, 10 giving judges more discretion than they held previ-
1. See Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 9-10 (2005); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Les-
sons for State and Federal Reformers, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 123, 123 (1993), available at 1993 WL
613746.
2. Berman, supra note 1, at 1.
3. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
4. Id. at 860.
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Id. at 490.
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8. Id. at 244.
9. See id. at 226, 234, 244.
10. Id. at 246.
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ously. This surprising remedy endorsed a vision of sentencing where
judges reigned supreme over juries.
Cunningham recalibrated the balance between judge and jury. The
opinion reaffirmed the central holding of Apprendi while retreating from
Booker's broad vision of judicial discretion. Because Cunningham
marks the most recent development in a growing body of United States
Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence, it provides a unique window
into a longstanding tension in sentencing philosophy and an important
opportunity to evaluate the future course of sentencing reform. Part I of
this comment explains the background of sentencing reform and contex-
tualizes Cunningham within the backdrop of modem sentencing reform
and contemporary Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence. Part II ana-
lyzes the majority opinion in Cunningham and the two dissenting opin-
ions. Part III examines how the majority opinion reflects a split in the
sentencing community over whether to entrust sentencing power to
judges or juries. After Cunningham, states are left with diametrically
opposed options for sentencing reform: (1) a sentencing system that calls
upon juries-either at trial or in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding-to
find the facts necessary to increase sentences above a statutory maxi-
mum; or (2) a system that gives judges broad discretion to individualize
sentences within a statutory range. To provide states with some guid-
ance, this comment argues that a system of jury fact-finding is a better
choice for states that rarely employ enhanced sentences; however, for
states that employ such sentences on a regular basis, a discretionary sys-
tem is more appropriate. Ultimately, the comment concludes that the
lack of direction offered by the Court in Cunningham leaves state legisla-
tures with the task of choosing the superior system without the guidance
of our nation's highest court.
I. BACKGROUND
Since the late 1970s, the United States has gone through a remark-
able period of sentencing reform and innovation." Concerned about
sentencing disparity, judicial inconsistency, and rising crime rates, states
began to switch from indeterminate to determinate sentencing systems.
12
Instead of allowing judges broad discretion in sentencing, as they were
afforded under indeterminate systems, determinate sentencing systems
established sentencing guidelines that prescribed presumptive sentences
a judge must impose for ordinary crimes. 13 A handful of recent Supreme
Court cases, however, have challenged the constitutionality of these sen-
tencing laws. These cases set a strong precedent for the holding in Cun-
ningham and demonstrate the Court's ongoing concern for judicial fact-
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finding that elevates a defendant's sentence beyond a maximum statutory
period.
A. Modern Sentencing Reform
In the first seventy years of the twentieth century, states afforded
judges "nearly unfettered discretion" to decide an appropriate sentence
for defendants.' 4 Most states employed this discretionary or indetermi-
nate approach to sentencing and grounded the approach in the rehabilita-
tive model of criminal punishment.' 5 According to this model, "sen-
tences [should] be tailored to the rehabilitation prospects and progress of
each individual offender."' 6 Judges were thought to have superior exper-
tise and insight into the length of sentence that would best suit the reha-
bilitative needs of each offender.' 7 In turn, they had broad authority to
determine a defendant's sentence within a prescribed statutory range.18
However, this highly discretionary approach led to unpredictability
and judicial inconsistency in sentencing.' 9 Evidence of sentencing dis-
parity emerged during the 1960s and 1970s as studies began to suggest
that sociological characteristics such as race, gender, and economic
status influenced the sentencing outcomes of certain offenders.20 In addi-
tion, with crime rates rising, support for the rehabilitative model began to
wane.2 1 Critics and legal scholars began to propose reforms that could
22
lead to greater uniformity and predictability in sentencing. Many
criminal justice scholars, led by the influential Judge Marvin Frankel,
14. Id. at 3; see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (Oxford University Press
1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (commenting on the wide discretion
given to federal judges to impose sentences during this time).
15. Berman, supra note 1, at 3; see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 5-7 (1981) (discussing the domi-
nance of the rehabilitative ideal in the United States until the 1970s).
16. Berman, supra note 1, at 3; see also Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's
Functions, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (1987) ("[w]ide discretion was
ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges and parole officers familiar with the
case to choose a disposition tailored to the offender's need for treatment.").
17. Berman, supra note 1, at 4; see also Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED.
SENT'G REP. 83, 84 (2002) (discussing the view of the judge as sentencing expert in rehabilitative
sentencing systems).
18. See Berman, supra note 1, at 4; see also Hirsch, supra note 16, at 3.
19. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (dis-
cussing studies showing unwarranted sentencing disparities); Norval Morris, Towards Principled
Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REv. 267, 272-74 (1977) (reviewing data ofjudicial sentencing disparity).
20. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R.
Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Dis-
parity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 358-62 (1991); Nagel, supra note 19, at 895.
21. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENTS 3-34, 59-123 (Hill & Wang 1976); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
169 (Basic Books 1975); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 3-72 (Basic Books 1975).
22. Berman, supra note 1, at 9.
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came to propose some form of sentencing guidelines. 23 Reformers used
sentencing guidelines to form determinate systems wherein criminal sen-
tences were mandated according to specialized procedures and judicial
findings of aggravating or mitigating facts.24
The federal government joined the sentencing reform movement by
passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.25 The legislation created
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a determinate sentencing
scheme upon the federal courts.26 Liberals favored federal sentencing
reform because of concerns about judges who discriminated on the basis
of race, class, and gender; conservatives supported sentencing reform
because of concerns about judges being too lenient on criminals.27 This
bipartisan distrust of judges led to an overhaul of the federal system and
the replacement of discretionary sentencing with a set of mechanical
formulas and rules.28
States followed in the footsteps of the federal government by creat-
ing sentencing commissions and adopting determinate sentencing
schemes that prescribed presumptive sentencing ranges for various of-
fenses. 29 Although the structure and form of these sentencing systems
varied, it was clear the "sentencing revolution" made an enormous im-
pact on state sentencing laws.30  Meanwhile, the ongoing tension be-
tween judge and jury remained. While the overall power of judges de-
creased under determinate sentencing laws, the laws required judges to
make sentencing determinations based upon judicial findings of fact. As
a result, the role of fact-finder shifted from jury to judge. This shift
forced the Supreme Court to confiont the issue of whether determinate
sentencing laws violated the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial.
23. Id. at 8; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988); Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1988).
24. See Berman, supra note 1, at 9-10.
25. Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1361 (1999)
(reviewing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1998)).
26. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 77.
27. Wright, supra note 25, at 1361.
28. The Guidelines established a mathematical system of calculating the proper punishment,
taking into account factors such as offense level and prior criminal conduct. The Guidelines re-
placed individualized moral judgment with "complex quantitative calculations that convey the im-
pression of scientific precision and objectivity." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 82, 84-85.
29. See Berman, supra note 1, at 9-10.
30. See id. at 11.
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B. Background Cases
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey
31
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
penalty enhancements imposed by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence violated the Sixth Amendment.3 1 The defendant in Apprendi
pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful pur-
pose, a second-degree offense under New Jersey law punishable by five
to ten years imprisonment. 33 However, a separate hate-crime statute al-
lowed the sentencing judge to provide for an "extended term" of impris-
onment based on the judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the crime was committed with "racial animus." 34 The trial judge in
Apprendi applied the enhancement statute and increased the defendant's
sentence to twelve years.3 5 The Supreme Court found that this sentence
enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment because, "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.,
36
Apprendi initiated the trend of using the Sixth Amendment as a tool
to limit judicial fact-finding in sentencing. Professor Erwin Chemerin-
sky argues that Apprendi stands for a simple principle: "Under the Sixth
Amendment, it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and sentence
that person for another. 3 7 The trial judge in Apprendi violated this prin-
ciple because the jury convicted the defendant of possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose, and yet the judge sentenced him for this offense
and a separate offense under the hate-crime statute for a crime involving
racial animus.38 The Court reasoned in Apprendi that the New Jersey
legislature could not hide behind the label of "sentencing enhancement"
to mask a determination concerning an element of the crime that needs to
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.39 Justice Stevens de-
scribed the ruling as a matter of "simple justice," and a basic extension of
previous legal precedents guaranteeing due process of law and the right
to trial by jury.40
31. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
32. Id. at 469.
33. Id. at 468-69.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 471.
36. Id. at 490.
37. Erwin Chemerinsky, Sentencing Guideline Law and Practice in a Post-Booker World:
The Road to Booker: Making Sense ofApprendi and lts Progeny, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 531, 532
(2006).
38. Id. at 534.
39. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
40. ld.
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In contrast, the dissent in Apprendi regarded the case as "watershed
change in constitutional law' '41 and anything but an extension of previous
legal precedents.42 The Court split five to four in Apprendi, with Justices
O'Connor and Breyer writing contentious dissents.43 Justice O'Connor
argued that the Sixth Amendment did not require the majority rule in
Apprendi and warned that "in light of the adoption of determinate-
sentencing schemes by many States and the Federal Government," the
consequences of the majority's opinion would be severe. 44  Justice
Breyer stressed the practical and administrative reasons why judges,
rather than juries, traditionally assessed sentencing factors. 45  He ex-
plained that in the sentencing process there are "far too many potentially
relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of
them to a jury.' 6 Furthermore, he argued, the Constitution does not em-
body such a requirement 47 and the Apprendi rule would impede legisla-
tive efforts to provide guidance and consistency in sentencing.
48
2. Blakely v. Washington
49
Blakely extended Apprendi's holding to penalty enhancements oc-
curring within a maximum statutory range. In 1998, Washington resi-
dent Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., was convicted of kidnapping his es-
tranged wife.50 Under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, the stan-
dard sentence for second-degree kidnapping was fifty-three months.
5 1
However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that Blakely
committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty," and increased the penalty
to ninety months.5 2 Blakely's elevated sentence was within Washing-
ton's statutory maximum for second-degree kidnapping and allowed un-
der the state's sentencing guidelines, which provided that sentencing
judges could impose higher sentences if they found "substantial and
compelling reasons justifying ... exceptional sentence[s].'
In another five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that Wash-
ington's guidelines were unconstitutional because they violated
Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 54 Justice Scalia ex-
plained that "the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sen-
tence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maxi-
41. Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 525.
43. Id. at 468, 523, 555.
44. Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 555-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 557.
47. Id. at 555.
48. Id. at 565.
49. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
50. Id. at 298.
51. Id. at 300.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 299.
54. Id. at 298, 314, 326, 328.
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mum he may impose without any additional findings." 55 By finding that
Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty," the trial judge in Blakely did not
determine a sentencing factor, but rather an element of the offense that
needed to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.56 The
Blakely majority supported Apprendi's dramatic vindication of the role
of the jury, and Justice Scalia concluded the opinion by stating: "every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all
facts legally essential to the punishment.,
57
In contrast, the dissent in Blakely denounced the majority opinion as
an unneeded encumbrance upon sentencing. Justice O'Connor predicted
that the ruling would trigger the end of "[o]ver 20 years of sentencing
reform," and that "tens of thousands of criminal judgments" would be
placed in jeopardy.58 Justice Kennedy argued that the holding would
force states to "scrap everything and start over." 59 Similarly, Justice
Breyer concluded that states would be left with a narrow range of options
for sentencing reform and argued that Apprendi's holding should have
been limited to prevent the dismantling of sentencing reform efforts.
60
Like the other dissenting justices, Justice Breyer expressed concern over
how the decision in Blakely would affect the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 61 This question would soon be answered by United States v.
Booker.
62
3. United States v. Booker63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Booker only six weeks af-
ter it decided Blakely.64 Like Washington state's sentencing guidelines,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines employed judicial fact-finding in or-
der to boost sentences into a higher guideline range.65 Not surprisingly,
the same five justices who comprised the majorities in Apprendi and
Blakely found that there was "no distinction of constitutional significance
between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington proce-
dures at issue in [Blakely].' 66 In a five to four decision, the Court held
that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges to
make additional findings of fact in order to compute increases in appli-
cable sentencing ranges. 67 The majority opinion authored by Justice Ste-
55. Id. at 303-04.
56. Id. at 301, 303-04.
57. Id. at 313.
58. Id. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 330, 346 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 346-47.
62. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
63. Id
64. Berman, supra note 1, at 38.
65. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id. at 225-26, 234-37, 244.
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vens reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."
68
In a separate opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court fash-
ioned a remedy for Justice Stevens's majority ruling.69 Instead of en-
grafting a Sixth Amendment jury trial right onto the Guidelines (as sug-
gested by the dissent), Justice Breyer chose to render the Guidelines
wholly advisory. 7° By severing and excising certain provisions of the
federal sentencing statute that made the Guidelines mandatory, the
Breyer majority held that the statute "[fell] outside the scope of Ap-
prendi's requirement.",71 Justice Breyer reasoned that this remedy was in
line with congressional intent and that an engrafted jury system was "far
more complex than Congress could have intended., 72 Last, the Court
instituted a "reasonableness" standard for appellate review of federal
sentences.73
Critics denounce Booker for its incoherence and inconsistency.74
The Breyer remedy seemed to bear no relation to the Sixth Amendment
violation or to past precedent. 75 One scholar astutely noted that "to cul-
minate a jurisprudence that previously seemed interested in vindicating
the role of the jury in modem sentencing systems, Booker devised a rem-
edy for the federal system that granted federal judges more sentencing
power than they had ever wielded previously., 76 Booker's surprising
remedy for judicial infringement upon the province of the jury was to
give judges more power than they held in the past. In the wake of
Booker, federal judges gained discretionary muscle while the power of
the jury's verdict remained the same.
II. CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
7 7
The trio of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker raised questions about
the permissible scope of judicial fact-finding under a variety of state sen-
tencing schemes.78 Before Cunningham, the Court had not addressed
whether a sentencing system like California's-which employed a triad
system of upper, middle, and lower-term sentencing-was constitutional
68. 1d at 244.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 259.
72. Id. at 254.
73. Id. at 261.
74. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 677 (2006).
75. Id.
76. Berman, supra note 1, at 39.
77. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
78. See People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 542 (Cal. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
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under the Sixth Amendment. 79 Cunningham solidified the views of Ap-
prendi and Blakely while retreating from Booker's surprising endorse-
ment of judicial discretion. In doing so, it readjusted the balance be-
tween judge and jury and realigned the trajectory of modern sentencing
jurisprudence.
A. Facts
Petitioner John Cunningham was convicted under California state
law of continuous sexual abuse of a child.s0 California's determinate
sentencing law (DSL) made the offense punishable by a lower term sen-
tence of six years, a middle term sentence of twelve years, or an upper
term sentence of sixteen years.8 1 In particular, the DSL required the "im-
position of the middle term, unless there [were] circumstances in aggra-
vation or mitigation of the crime." 82 It allowed a judge to impose the
upper term only if, after considering all of the relevant facts, "the cir-
cumstances in aggravation outweigh[ed] the circumstances in mitiga-
tion. 83  California's sentencing rules provided a nonexclusive list of
aggravating circumstances, including "facts relating to the crime" and
"facts relating to the defendant. 84  In addition, the DSL permitted a
judge to consider any "additional criteria reasonably related to the deci-
sion being made., 85 However, under the DSL, "a fact that is an element
of the crime . . . [could] not be used to impose the upper term. 86 In
Cunningham's case, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence six aggravating circumstances and one circumstance in
mitigation.87 The judge concluded that Cunningham's aggravators out-
weighed the lone mitigating factor, and imposed an upper-term sentence
of sixteen years.88
B. Procedural History
A panel of the California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of
the sentencing judge. 89 The California Supreme Court denied review of
the case, 90 but in People v. Black,9' an earlier decision, it held that the
DSL did not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.92 One justice dissented in Black, arguing that the DSL only sur-
79. See id. at 542-43.
80. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 861.
83. Id. at 863 n.9.
84. Id. at 863.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 860-61.
88. Id. at 861.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
92. Id. at 547-49.
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vived Sixth Amendment inspection if: "(1) a jury has made a finding on
the aggravating fact, (2) the defendant has admitted the aggravating fact,
(3) the defendant has validly waived the right to a jury trial on the aggra-
vating fact, or (4) the aggravating fact relates to the defendant's criminal
record.. .
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cunningham
and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.94
C. Majority Opinion
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that
California's DSL violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.95
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas
joined in the majority opinion.96 Adhering to precedent, the majority
found that the DSL violated Apprendi's "bright-line rule" that "any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."97 Specifically, the majority found the DSL violated Apprendi
because it allowed a judge to find facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, elevating a defendant's sentence to an upper term.
98
The majority in Cunningham ruled that the middle term, and not the
upper term, as interpreted by the court in Black, was the relevant statu-
tory maximum for constitutional analysis.99 The majority concluded that
the "statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 00  Under this rule, the DSL's
statutory maximum was the middle term because the upper term required
judicial fact-finding of aggravating factors.'
0'
Even though the DSL gave judges broad discretion to identify ag-
gravating factors, the majority reasoned that the jury verdict did not re-
flect these factors and thus the DSL did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
requirement.1 2 Justice Ginsburg quickly dismissed the Black court's
arguments that the DSL survived Sixth Amendment inspection because it
reduced penalties over the prior indeterminate system and required sen-
tence "enhancements," as opposed to sentence elevations, to be charged
in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.0 3 She
93. Black, 113 P.3d at 550 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
94. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871.
95. Id. at 860.
96. Id. at 859.
97. Id. at 868.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 871.
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 869.
103. Id.
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explained that Apprendi's "bright-line rule" does not exclude sentencing
systems that allow for the submission of some facts to judges and some
facts to juries.'0 4 Under Apprendi and Blakely, all facts essential to pun-
ishment (other than the fact of a prior conviction) must be submitted to
the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'0 5
In addition, the Cunningham majority found the Black court's com-
parison between the DSL and the post-Booker federal system unpersua-
sive.' 06 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "California's DSL does not re-
semble the advisory system the Booker Court had in view" because
"judges are not free to exercise their discretion to select a specific sen-
tence within a defined range."' 07 Cunningham's sentencing judge did not
have the discretion to choose a sentence within a range of six to sixteen
years, but rather was required to select the twelve-year sentence if he did
not find any circumstances in aggravation or mitigation.'0 8 Further, the
DSL's requirement that judge-determined sentences be reasonable did
not make it immune to Sixth Amendment inspection. 0 9 Justice Ginsburg
held that "[t]he reasonableness requirement Booker anticipated for the
federal system operates within the Sixth Amendment constraints deline-
ated in our precedent, not as a substitute for those constraints."" 0 By
rejecting the Black court's comparison to the federal system, the Court
reaffirmed the important role of the Sixth Amendment in sentencing ju-
risprudence. "' Cunningham departed from Booker's broad vision of




Justice Kennedy's dissent stressed the practical reasons why judges
rather than juries should hold authority in deciding sentences." 2 "Judges
and sentencing officials have a broad view and long-term commitment to
correctional systems," Justice Kennedy wrote. "Juries do not."' 1 3 Justice
Kennedy argued that the Apprendi principle could be limited by distin-
guishing between sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the
offense and sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the of-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 870.
107. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
111. See id. at 876 ("Booker's remedy for the Federal Guidelines, in short, is not a recipe for
rendering our Sixth Amendment case law toothless.") (emphasis omitted).
112. Id. at 872 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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fender.1 14 The Apprendi rule would be applied to the former and not to
the latter. 15 Under the offense/offender distinction, juries would be re-
quired to find facts relating to the nature of the offense, for instance if a
weapon was used, while judges could continue to find facts relating to
the nature of the offender, for instance the offender's lack of remorse. 
16
The majority had rejected this distinction, holding that "Apprendi itself..
. leaves no room for the bifurcated approach Justice Kennedy pro-
poses."' 17
2. Justice Alito
Justice Alito argued that California's DSL was indistinguishable
from the post-Booker federal system. 18 First, both systems granted sen-
tencing judges "considerable discretion in sentencing."' 19 Like the fed-
eral advisory system, California's DSL granted trial judges wide discre-
tion to choose from a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating
factors.' 20 A California trial judge could also consider "[g]eneral objec-
tives of sentencing ' 2 1 and any "additional criteria reasonably related to
the decision being made."' 122 The DSL "recognize[d] that a sentencing
judge must have the ability to look at all the relevant facts-even those
outside the trial record and jury verdict-in exercising his or her discre-
tion." 123 Second, like the federal system, the DSL required that judicial
discretion be exercised reasonably. 24  Even when a judge decided to
impose the standard middle term, his or her decision was reviewable for
reasonableness. 25  Justice Alito argued that these two factors-broad
judicial discretion and a reasonableness standard of review-satisfied the
requirements for constitutionality outlined by the Court in Booker.
126
Additionally, Justice Alito contended that aggravating circum-
stances do not necessarily need to be adjudicative facts. 27 He found that
California judges possess the power "to take into account the full pano-
ply of factual and policy considerations that have traditionally been con-
sidered by judges operating under fully discretionary sentencing re-
gimes.' ' 128 Even if the California system did require judges to find some
aggravating facts, judicial fact-finding was not fully inconsistent with
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 872-73.
117. Id. at 869 n.14 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 877.
121. Id. (quoting Cal. Rule of Court (Criminal Cases) 4.410(a)).
122. Id. (quoting Cal. Rule of Court (Criminal Cases) 4.408(a)).
123. Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 873.
127. Id. at 879.
128. Id.
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Booker.129 Justice Alito argued that "Booker's reasonableness review
necessarily supposes that some sentences will be unreasonable in the
absence of additional facts justifying them.' 30 In order for judges to
support their choices of higher or lower sentences, they must reference
some facts.' 3 ' Therefore, Justice Alito reasoned, "it is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment for the imposition of an enhanced sentence to be con-
ditioned on a factual finding made by a sentencing judge and not a
jury.
' 32
The majority rejected Justice Alito's argument on the ground that
"under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a
greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge." 133 In
what might prove to be Cunningham's most enduring line, Justice Gins-
burg declared: "Booker's remedy for the Federal Guidelines, in short, is
not a recipe for rendering our Sixth Amendment case law toothless."'
' 34
In the end, the Court split into two camps. The majority praised the role
of the jury while the dissent clung to Booker's endorsement of judicial
discretion. These conflicting opinions would be reflected in the Court's
disparate proposals for reform.
III. ANALYSIS
Cunningham struck a blow to sentencing reform. Under Cunning-
ham, states can essentially choose between two options: (1) a sentencing
system that calls upon juries-either at trial or in a bifurcated sentencing
proceeding-to find the facts necessary to increase sentences above a
statutory maximum; or (2) a system that gives judges broad discretion to
individualize sentences within a statutory range. 135 The majority did not
impose a specific remedy on California, but rather left California free to
choose between converse schemes. 1 36 As a result, Cunningham raises the
question: why are decision makers left with such contradictory proposals
for reform?
This comment argues that the Court's divergent proposals mirror a
split in the sentencing community over whether to entrust sentencing
power to judges or juries. As the most recent outgrowth of the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases, Cunningham presents an excellent opportunity to
explore the tension in sentencing philosophy and its implications for the
future of sentencing reform. In the end, Cunningham gave states little
guidance on which of the two sentencing systems is better suited to
129. Id. at 879-80.
130. Id. at 880.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 863-64 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 870.
135. Id. at 871.
136. See id.
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achieve the interests of justice. Accordingly, the latter parts of this sec-
tion examine Cunningham's two systems in detail and advise states on
the best options for reform. For states that rarely impose enhanced sen-
tences, a system of jury fact-finding, particularly a bifurcated jury sys-
tem, is the better choice. For states that regularly impose enhanced sen-
tences, however, a discretionary system of advisory guidelines is more
appropriate.
A. Judge or Jury: Conflicting Proposals for Reform
The sentencing community stands divided on whether to entrust
sentencing power to judges or juries. Supporters of judicial discretion
believe that judges are able to individualize sentences in a way that can-
not be accomplished by a mechanical set of rules or procedures. 3 7 Some
have argued that: "[g]enuine judgment, in the sense of moral reckoning,
cannot be inscribed in a table of offense levels and criminal history cate-
gories."'1 38 Judges possess the ability to look at a host of unique factors
and impose case-specific sentencing judgments. 139 Also, they are able to
combine their insights about individual cases with an understanding of
the criminal justice system as a whole. 140 Because judges sentence regu-
larly, they have the opportunity to improve their sentencing methodology
and become more consistent in their sentencing practices.
14'
Critics of judicial sentencing charge that judicial discretion leads to
"unwarranted sentencing disparity."'142 Unwarranted sentencing disparity
results when judges impose different sentences in cases that are alike in
relevant ways. 143 A large amount of literature discusses racial discrimi-
nation in sentencing outcomes, with considerable scrutiny applied to the
disparate treatment of African Americans.'" Even today, when there is
more diversity in the leadership of the courts, young black and Latino
males are subject to particularly harsh sentences as compared to other
offender populations. 145 This disparity goes against the ideal of equal
treatment under the law and principles of social justice.
137. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 82.
138. Id.
139. See William W. Schwarzer, Commentary, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED.
SENT'G. REP. 339, 339 (1991).
140. Wright, supra note 25, at 1373.
141. Id. at 1378.
142. Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 241-44
(1999).
143. Wright, supra note 25, at 1361; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2007).
144. See TUSHAR KANSAL, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 4-6 (Marc Mauer ed., The Sentencing Project 2005); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentenc-
ing, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 733, 733 (2001).
145. KANSAL, supra note 144, at 1-2, 7-10.
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Distrust of judicial discretion also developed out of concern that
judges are especially susceptible to corruption. Scandals involving cor-
rupt judges are not uncommon in the United States and throughout the
world.' 46 For instance, in 1996, a California court found three California
Superior Court judges and an attorney guilty of corruption. 47 The attor-
ney had given the judges a total of $100,000 in gifts in return for favor-
able assistance. 48  In the end, two judges resigned and one was re-
moved.149 As can be expected, scandals of this magnitude led to negative
public perceptions of judges. In an early 2005 Harris Poll, only a small
percentage (22%) of one thousand adults surveyed had a "great deal" of
confidence in the judiciary.' 50 About sixty percent had "only some" con-
fidence and twenty percent had "hardly any" confidence. 15' Over the
past decade, fears of overt judicial bias (i.e. judicial corruption) intensi-
fied public distrust of the judiciary and contributed to various calls for
sentencing reform. 
5 2
Disparity in sentencing, mistrust of the judiciary, and the elevation
of the role of the jury by the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases have led
some scholars to propose enacting jury sentencing in non-capital cases. 1
53
In 2003, Professor Jenia Iontcheva argued that the reintroduction of jury
sentencing is "the final logical step suggested by the Apprendi line of
decisions."' 154  She contended that jury sentencing would lead to more
legitimate sentencing practices. 155 Juries possess a more democratic and
diverse composition than the ranks of state judges, and deliberation
among jurors is likely to transform individual biases.' 56 Juries are also
better able to represent "the conscience of the community" and reflect
146. J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial Independ-




150. Harris Interactive, Overall Confidence in Leaders of Major Institutions Declines Slightly
(Harris Poll #21, March 17, 2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=550
(last visited September 12, 2007).
151. Id.
152. For instance, in South Dakota in 1996, a small but disgruntled minority campaigned for a
Judicial Accountability Initiative Law ("J.A.I.L.") which would have allowed litigants to sue judges
for various kinds of misconduct. The J.A.I.L. website stated that its supporters aimed "to end the
rampant and pervasive judicial corruption in the legal system of the United States." The site also
guaranteed that J.A.I.L. would do away with the widespread problem of "arbitrary decision-making
by judges." Leita Walker, Protecting Judges from White's Aftermath: How the Public-Employee
Speech Doctrine Might Help Judges and the Courts in Which They Work, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
371, 383 (2007). The initiative ultimately failed to pass. Id.
153. Vikram David Amar, Implementing an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age ofAdminis-
trative Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 294 (2005); Jenia lontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases. An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775,
1776 (1999).
154. lontcheva, supra note 153, at 314.
155. Id. at 344.
156. Id at 363-64.
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public outrage at the transgression of community standards. 57 The pub-
lic perceives juries to be fairer than the judicial system in general, and
increased juror participation in sentencing would likely increase these
positive attitudes. 5 8  Juries could render individualized judgments and
bring fresh perspectives to the process of sentencing. 1
59
However, opponents of jury sentencing charge that juries are not
capable of making consistent sentencing decisions. Two studies from
Texas found greater variability in jury sentencing than in judicial sen-
tencing.160 As one scholar has noted: "Unable to situate the case before
them within the larger sentencing framework, juries ... render disparate
judgments in similar cases in violation of the basic principle of equality
before the law."'16 1 Critics of jury sentencing believe that juries do not
possess the expertise to deal effectively with complicated issues. 62 For
instance, in In Re Japanese Electric Products Antitrust Litigation,163 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that juries
are ill-equipped to hear cases involving complex civil issues and that in
those cases the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the right to a
jury trial1 64 Jurors, like judges, possess subjective biases, but may be
less inclined than judges to adhere to the principles of the law. Critics
accuse jurors of basing their verdicts on irrelevant factors, such as a de-
fendant's or counsel's appearance, or even the defendant's race or eth-
nicity. 165 Several extensive studies of capital juries found that racial dis-
crimination played a role in juries' decisions to impose the death pen-
alty.' 66 While juries have a more democratic make-up than the ranks of
state judges, they may be just as susceptible to unconscious biases. 1
67
In the end, there is no clear consensus on whether to entrust judges
or juries with sentencing power. Accordingly, the disparate proposals in
157. Lanni, supra note 153, at 1782.
158. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 348-49.
159. Id. at 350, 353.
160. Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 30-32 (1994); Charles W. Webster, Jury
Sentencing- Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221,226 (1960).
161. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 356.
162. See Wright, supra note 25, at 1378; Weninger, supra note 160, at 5; Charles 0. Betts, Jury
Sentencing, 2 NAT'L PROB. AND PAROLE ASS'N J. 369, 372 (1956).
163. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (7th Cir. 1980).
164. Id.
165. H.M. LaFont, Assessment of Punishment - A Judge or Jury Function?, 38 TEX. L. REV.
835, 842 (1959-1960).
166. David C. Baldus ET AL., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1679 (1998) (finding that in Philadelphia, defendants convicted of killing white victims
were more likely to be sentenced to death); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death
Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trial: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes, 7 JUST. Q. 189, 189
(1990) (finding that, in Kentucky, blacks accused of killing whites were more likely to be charged
with a capital crime and sentenced to die than homicide offenders); William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ.
563, 593-628 (1980).
167. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 363.
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Cunningham reflect the inability of sentencing scholars to agree on the
appropriate method of sentencing reform. Both judge- and jury-centered
sentencing systems possess inherent strengths and weaknesses. Judges
bring training and expertise while juries bring inclusiveness and democ-
ratic deliberation. The Cunningham opinion neglected to give state leg-
islatures guidance on which system to impose, instead leaving the choice
to individual states. Perhaps the only unifying principle from Cunning-
ham is that state legislatures will no longer be able to give weight to spe-
cific aggravating factors and require judges to find the presence of those
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.'
68
To retain the structure of their determinate systems, state legisla-
tures can either give more power to juries by moving toward a bifurcated
jury system, or they can give more power to judges by moving toward an
indeterminate sentencing regime. To paraphrase the words of Justice
Breyer: "The ball now lies in [each state's] court."' 69
B. Jury Systems
The first option for state legislatures under Cunningham is to pre-
serve the basic makeup of determinate sentencing, but add a new twist of
jury fact-finding. 7 States essentially have two alternatives in this re-
gard: (1) a complicated charge system where aggravating factors are en-
compassed within the elements of the crime; or (2) a bifurcated jury sys-
tem where juries decide in an after-trial proceeding whether aggravating
factors are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' 71 In the first system, ju-
ries would need to render special verdicts stating not only whether the
elements of the crime were met, but also whether aggravating factors
were present. 72 In the second system, one jury would determine if a
defendant was guilty and a bifurcated jury would decide beyond a rea-
sonable doubt any fact (other than a prior conviction) that raises a defen-
dant's sentence beyond a maximum statutory period.
73
1. Charge Systems
In charge systems, all crimes would have a complex set of elements
in order to encompass the facts that would increase the sentence of a
criminal offender. 174 Each crime would be defined by a multitude of
factors, including, for example, the presence of violence, the type of
weapon involved, the degree of injury to the victim, or the amount of
drugs possessed or distributed. 175 Thus, a robbery statute might increase
168. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 868 (2007).
169. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220, 265 (2005).
170. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871.
171. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 334, 336 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 334.
173. ld. at 336.
174. Id. at 334.
175. Id.
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punishment based upon the following factors: the nature of the institution
robbed; the presence of a firearm; any serious bodily injury to the vic-
tims; or any large property loss. 176 The charge system requires only a
single jury, but necessitates that the jury render a special verdict based
upon the aggravating factors for each offense.1
77
As noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Apprendi, the charge
system puts defendants in a difficult position of denying guilt while of-
fering proof about how they committed a crime.17 8 For example, a de-
fendant could be put in the position of saying, "I did not sell drugs, but I
sold no more than 500 grams."'179 Also, prosecutors in the charge system
would control both the charge and the punishment.' 80 Prosecutors could
use this power to engage in so-called "charge bargaining" and indict
similar defendants with different aggravating factors for the same real
criminal conduct.18' Additionally, the charge system would force prose-
cutors to "charge all relevant facts about the way the crime was commit-
ted before a pre-sentence investigation examines the criminal conduct,
perhaps before the trial itself."' 182 This system would require a prosecutor
to decide which elements of the crime to charge the defendant with be-
fore discovering and evaluating all the evidence.
183
For these reasons, it is easy to dismiss the charge system as an ineq-
uitable method of sentencing reform.
2. Bifurcated Jury Systems
Bifurcated jury systems cure many of the problems associated with
charge systems, but they come with administrative costs. 184 Bifurcated
trials cost states more money, add complexity to sentencing enterprises,
and require additional judicial resources. 85 Like charge systems, bifur-
cated jury systems might also increase prosecutorial power. 8 6  Some
defendants in a bifurcated jury system might become more hesitant to go
to trial and risk two jury decisions.' 87 However, some defendants might
benefit from the system if the increased cost of trial "makes prosecutors
176. Id.
177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-56 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 557.
179. Id.
180. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id.; Joy Anne Boyd, Commentary, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of
Justice's Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 595 (2004) (defining "charge bargaining" as a form of
plea bargaining in which the prosecutor would agree to drop certain charges if the defendant agrees
to plead guilty to other charges).
182. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 336.
185. Id.
186. Jd. at 334, 338.
187. Id. at 337.
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more willing to cede certain sentencing issues to the defense."' 88 Under
a bifurcated jury system, a defendant could bargain with a prosecutor in
order to avoid a lengthy trial and a drawn-out sentencing proceeding.'
89
Most states favor adopting the bifurcated jury system. 90 Such a
system allows them "to continue to adhere to the principles on which
their [determinate] systems were based and to do so with minimal
changes to sentencing procedures."' 9 1 Many states are confident in the
ability of determinate sentencing systems to reduce sentencing disparity
and increase sentencing predictability.' 92 Currently, four states employ a
bifurcated jury system. 193 Most of these states utilize bifurcated juries
only when evidence in support of an aggravated sentence is inadmissible
at trial. 194 When such evidence is admissible, however, the states use a
charge system and juries render special verdicts on aggravating fac-
tors. 195 The split system reduces administrative costs, but does not ad-
dress the previously discussed problems with charge systems.
States considering a pure bifurcated jury system may be encouraged
by the success of a workable model already in place in Kansas.' 96 Under
the Kansas system, a judge decides what facts to introduce at trial and
what facts to introduce at sentencing. 97 A post-trial jury-usually the
same jury as used in the trial phase-determines beyond a reasonable
doubt any aggravating factors which may increase the defendant's sen-
tence. 198 If a jury finds aggravating factors present in a specific case, the
judge may impose an elevated sentence, but is under no obligation to do
so. 199
The Kansas model is successful for a number of reasons. 200 First,
enhanced sentences "have been a historical rarity in Kansas. ' 2°  Either
prosecutors do not tend to seek enhanced sentences or most sentences
fall within the standard range. Similarly, most criminal sentences in
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to
Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 7, 2 (2005).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5.
193. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4716(b), 21-4718(b) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2005); 2005
Or. Laws ch. 463, §§ 3(1), 4(1); S.B. 5312, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 377, sec. 10 (Wash. 2007);
H.B. 2070, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 205, sec. 2 (Wash. 2007). These are the states that use juries to
find sentencing factors, not the states that employ so-called "jury sentencing" where juries decide
and impose the actual sentence.
194. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10 subsec. 5; Or. Laws ch. 463, §§ 3(1), 4(1); S.B. 5312, 60th
Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 377, sec. 10; H.B. 2070,60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 205, sec. 2.
195. Id.
196. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 2.
197. Katie M. McVoy, Note, "What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come to Pass ": Blakely,
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1637 (2005).
198. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 2.
199. McVoy, supra note 197, at 1637.
200. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 3.
201. Id.
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Kansas are determined through plea bargains which do not require addi-
tional jury fact-finding. 20 2 Defendants admit to the presence of certain
facts in order to receive negotiated sentences. Third, anecdotal evidence
suggests that post-verdict sentencing juries are rarely employed and that
when they are, the use of such juries "does not create significant addi-
tional burdens on the system. 2 °3
The flaw in the Kansas system is that judges retain the discretion to
use the jury-determined factors as they please. Judges can use the jury-
determined factors to sentence a defendant beyond a presumptive range,
or they can ignore the factors and sentence the defendant within the stan-
dard range. 204 Bifurcated juries are of no value if a judge can simply
nullify the jury's conclusions. Uniformity also suffers if judges possess
the discretion to decide if and when to use the jury-determined factors.2 °5
Judges operating under indeterminate sentencing schemes possess the
same freedom to ignore or utilize relevant sentencing factors, but such
systems do not require the added costs of bifurcated juries.
Nevertheless, the success of the Kansas model provides support for
the proposition that a bifurcated jury system is the best approach for
states that rarely impose enhanced sentences. Such an approach allows
states to preserve the basic structure of their determinate sentencing sys-
tems while rendering these systems Cunningham-compliant. If a state's
use of jury fact-finding in sentencing is minimal, the evidence from Kan-
sas suggests that the two-tiered jury system will not impose significant
burdens on the criminal justice system and will not add large administra-
tive costs. 206 The reality of criminal justice today is that most sentences
are reached through plea bargaining, a process that decreases the need for
jury fact-finding. 20 7 In addition, jury fact-finding is not needed when
judges impose aggravated sentences on the basis of past criminal con-
duct.
20 8
To improve upon the Kansas system, states should require judges to
adhere to the jury's factual findings. Allowing a judge to nullify the
jury's factual conclusions only undercuts the legitimacy of a bifurcated
jury system. A system that uses the structure of the Kansas model, but
actually gives weight to the decisions of the jury, would better promote
the goals of uniformity and consistency in sentencing. Such a system is
the best option for states that rarely impose enhanced sentences because
it allows them to retain the structure of their determinate sentencing sys-
tems without a large increase in administrative costs. States can continue
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2.
205. See McVoy, supra note 197, at 1629.
206. See id. at 1640-41.
207. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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to mandate sentences according to the presence of aggravating and miti-
gating factors because these factors are determined by a bifurcated jury.
By adding a new twist of jury fact-finding, states can continue to sen-
tence offenders according to the principles and procedures of determinate
sentencing without a large increase in cost and complexity.
3. Indeterminate Sentencing Systems
However, if states impose enhanced sentences on a regular basis, a
bifurcated jury system will likely add significant costs and complexity to
state sentencing enterprises. States prescribing enhanced sentences fre-
quently would be wise to consider implementing indeterminate sentenc-
ing systems. Fortunately, the second option under Cunningham is to
allow judges broad discretion to individualize sentences within a statu-
tory range.209 The Supreme Court has consistently found that such a
system "encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal."2t0  In Booker, the
Breyer majority created a remedy for the federal system that allowed
judges wide power to sentence criminal defendants according to indi-
vidualized notions of justice.211 The majority found that such a remedy
"falls outside of the Apprendi requirement.,
212
a. Pure Indeterminate Systems
Pure indeterminate systems give judges wide leverage to determine
sentencing factors.213 Judges could take into account both offense and
offender characteristics in order to individualize sentences to specific
offenders. 1 4 They could consider the charged conduct, the offender's
life circumstances, and the offender's prospects for rehabilitation.1 5
Under a pure indeterminate system, judges would also be able to use
their expertise and knowledge to situate sentences within the framework
of the criminal justice system as a whole.216 They could rely on their
experience and knowledge to improve sentencing practices and adjust
their sentencing according to the best practices and available research. 17
Indeterminate systems are not without flaws, though.21 8  A purely
indeterminate system could lead to the same sentencing disparities that
209. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).
210. Id.
211. McConnell, supra note 74, at 666.
212. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
213. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 37, 53 (2006).
214. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) ("We should be clear that nothing in
this history suggests that it is impermissible for judge to exercise discretion-taking into considera-
tion various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing judgment within the range
prescribed by statute.").
215. Berman, supra note 1, at 3-4.
216. Wright, supra note 25, at 1373.
217. Id. at 1378.
218. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314-16 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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determinate sentencing systems were created to counteract.21 9 Justice
Breyer noted in his Blakely dissent that under discretionary systems,
"[t]he length of time a person spent in prison appear[ed] to depend on
'what the judge ate for breakfast' on the day of sentencing, on which
judge you got, or on other factors that should not have made a difference
to the length of the sentence. 220  If history is any indication, judges
could return to the same sentencing practices that led to disparities in
sentencing based on sociological factors like race, gender, and economic
status.2 2 1 This type of system would neither promote uniformity nor fair-
ness in decision-making.
b. Advisory Guideline Systems
A more nuanced version of indeterminate sentencing would allow
for the employment of advisory sentencing guidelines.222 Judges would
be advised to take certain factors into account and would be required to
justify departures from a set of advisory sentencing guidelines. 223 Guide-
lines could provide information about statistical averages, codify best
practices, and provide "mental anchors or benchmarks that exert gravita-
tional pull [upon judges]. 22 4  Recent studies suggest that voluntary
guidelines reduce inter-judge disparity because judges follow the guide-
lines out of concern for their reputations or apprehension about being
labeled deviant. 225
An advisory guidelines system is closely in line with the remedy
fashioned in Booker, and provides states with a viable alternative to jury
fact-finding. This system is more appropriate for states that employ sen-
tence enhancements on a regular basis because it is less costly and less
complicated than a bifurcated jury system. 226 So far, three states-
Indiana, Tennessee, and now, California--employ advisory guidelines.227
Concerns about the costs and burdens of jury fact-finding may have
driven the choices of both Indiana and Tennessee.228 A Tennessee task
force on sentencing reported that jury fact-finding would "increase ser-
vice time of jurors, increase jury trial time on the court docket, impose
increased burdens on public defenders and district attorneys and other-
wise increase the costs of the administration of justice. 2 29 Evidence
219. Seeid. at 318.
220. Id. at 332 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See Berman, supra note 1, at 8.
222. Berman & Bibas, supra note 213, at 70.
223. Id at 71.
224. Id. at 69.
225. Id.
226. See Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN
CRIMINAL SENTENCING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT
FACTORS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 3 (2005)).
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from Tennessee and Indiana suggests that for states with a higher than
average rate of imposing enhanced sentences, switching to a voluntary
system is a "more practically appropriate reaction than the creation of
jury fact-finding.
2 30
To improve upon a system of advisory guidelines, states should im-
plement a reasonableness standard of appellate review. Implementing a
reasonableness standard of review within an advisory guideline system
would promote consistency and guide appellate courts "in determining
whether a sentence 'is unreasonable' . . ..,,23 Douglas Berman and
Stephanos Bibas argue that the standard of appellate review for sentenc-
ing decisions should be "reasoned judgment. 232 In other words, judges
should conform to the presumptive guidelines range when there is good
reason to conform and depart from the range when there are specific rea-
sons for doing so.233 A specific method for promoting "reasoned judg-
ment" is to require sentencing judges to adhere to procedural steps. 34
These steps would require judges to "find guidelines facts, calculate
guidelines ranges, consider departures and statutory factors, recognize
that the guidelines are not mandatory, and give reasoned explanations for
sentences whether they fall within or outside the presumptive range. ''235
"Appellate courts [would] reverse sentences that do not comply with
[the] procedures and presume reasonable . .. those sentences that do
comply. '236 This system of review gives judges room to depart from
sentencing guidelines when necessary, but encourages judges to comply
with the guidelines in ordinary cases.237
To curb judicial bias in sentencing, states should promote judicial
education and awareness-raising. Judges cannot overcome biases if they
are not aware of them.238 To educate judges on sentencing disparity,
states could offer judicial courses about different forms of race, gender,
and ethnic discrimination. Judges would be required to attend at least
one of these courses per calendar year. During the courses, judges could
do a self-inventory of potential biases and assess how these biases might
affect judicial decision making.239 Judges could then make a conscious
effort to set those biases aside in order to render fairer and more impar-
tial decisions.240 The work of bar associations to develop sections de-
voted to women and minorities and the efforts of these sections to edu-
230. Id. at 6.
231. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994
ed.)).
232. Berman & Bibas, supra note 213, at 70.
233. Id. at 70-71.
234. Id. at 71.
235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994).
239. Id. at 58-59.
240. Id. at 58.
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cate the legal public about myths related to biases should also be empha-
sized in order to eradicate prejudice within the legal system.24" '
Finally, to promote consistency in sentencing, states could set up a
computer database that would allow judges access to information con-
cerning average sentences for specific crimes. Court administrators in
Scotland developed such a system in order to help judges recognize rele-
vant sentencing patterns.242 Scottish judges tap into the system by de-
termining the "aspects of the case. .. 'relevant' for purposes of compari-
son." 243  Judges select the category of the crime (such as theft or sexual
assault), offense characteristics (type of weapon, victim, etc.), and of-
fender characteristics (criminal history, sex, age, etc.) from the computer
software.244 The database then yields information about sentences im-
posed in past cases, including a complete distribution of the ranges of
sentences imposed.245 This system allows judges to conform their sen-
tences to past cases and draw on the guidance of relevant sentencing pat-
terns.246 States could implement such a system by using their own statis-
tical sentencing data or data from the federal system.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Cunningham, the state of
California choose to implement a system of advisory guidelines.247 Sen-
ate Bill 40, authored by Senator Gloria Romero, modified the DSL to
afford judges the discretion to decide whether to sentence a defendant to
a low, middle, or upper term.2 48 The bill stated that the choice of the
appropriate term will "rest within the sound discretion of the court., 2 49 It
required judges to state their reasons for choosing a certain sentence
length, but allowed judges the discretion to choose amongst the three
sentencing ranges. Such a system is the best option for states that
regularly impose enhanced sentences because it is less costly and com-
plicated than a bifurcated jury system. This system allows states to re-
tain the basic framework of their sentencing guidelines but converts these
guidelines into advisory procedures. To improve upon a system of advi-
sory guidelines, states should also provide for judicial education and
technological assistance. This modified system would represent the most
equitable method of indeterminate sentencing reform.
241. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The proverbial sentencing reform ball is now in the court of the
states.25' The Cunningham decision hardened the central holdings of
Apprendi and Blakely while retreating from Booker's broad vision of
judicial discretion. / Cunningham left states with two divergent propos-
als for reform: (1) a sentencing system that calls upon juries-either at
trial or in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding-to find the facts necessary
to increase sentences above a statutory maximum; or (2) a system that
gives judges broad discretion to individualize sentences within a statu-
tory range.253
The diametrically different proposals offered by the Court in Cun-
ningham reflect a spilt in the sentencing community over whether to en-
trust sentencing power to judges or to juries. Judges possess the exper-
tise and knowledge to craft sentences that accurately reflect the circum-
stances of the offense and the offender. However, unlimited judicial
discretion can led to sentencing disparity. As Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson pithily expressed: "It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of
justice that the judgment meted out to an offender should depend in large
part on a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the personality of the
particular judge before whom the case happens to come for disposi-
tion., 254 In response, some sentencing scholars have suggested employ-
ing jury sentencing. Juries have a more democratic makeup than the
ranks of state judges and can better express community outrage. On the
other hand, jurors possess subjective biases and may lack the expertise to
handle complicated criminal cases. The sentencing community remains
conflicted on the judge-jury issue and will likely remain so in the years
to come.
In the near future, states affected by Cunningham will need to re-
form their determinate sentencing schemes. States infrequently imposing
enhanced sentences would be wise to switch to a bifurcated jury system,
specifically a system that requires judges to adhere to the jury's recom-
mendations. On the other hand, states imposing enhanced sentences on a
regular basis may find an indeterminate system more appropriate. By
implementing advisory guidelines, a reasonableness standard of review,
and judicial training and education within an indeterminate system, states
can reduce sentencing disparity. Regardless of which system states
choose, at the heart of the sentencing struggle will remain the tension
between judge and jury, and the difficulty of harmonizing the objectives
251. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).
252. See id. at 860, 871.
253. Id. at 871.
254. James A. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Smith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing
Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 275 (1999)
(citation omitted).
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of individualized justice and fairness with the goals of uniformity and
consistency.
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